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California Garagemen's Liens-Impact And
Aftermath Of Adams v. Department Of
Motor Vehicles
In 1974 1he California Supreme Court abrogated the garage-
man's right to extrajudicially enforce his lien on a vehicle for which
repair charges had not been paid. The court, however, condoned
the garageman's temporary retention of the vehicle pending ju-
dicial resolution of the underlying dispute concerning the repair
bill. The California Legislature has responded to the supreme
court's ruling with legislation aimed at expediting the lien en-
forcement procedure in specified situations. The author examines
this new legislation in light of procedural due process standards
enunciated in a series of decisions of the United States and Cali-
fornia Supreme Courts and suggests constitutional challenges which
derive from legislative delegation of a lien foreclosure power
to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The author recom-
mends amendments to the new legislation which would cure these
constitutional objections while upholding the right of the garage-
man to enforce his lien when based upon a valid claim.
Prior to 1969 creditors enjoyed both legislative and judicial approval
of summary prejudgment remedies. However, in that year the United
States Supreme Court established i Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.1 that a debtor must be afforded, with limited exceptions, the
procedural due process requisites of notice and hearing before his
property may be seized. In 1974 the California Supreme Court ap-
plied the Sniadach principles in Adams v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles2 to invalidate a garageman's right to enforce his statutory lien
extrajudicially. The California Legislature, in the same year, enacted
a new law' (hereinafter referred to as Senate Bill 2293) which rein-
stated the garageman's right to enforcement, subject to certain enumer-
ated conditions. Thus, within a period of less than a year, the garage-
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
3. S.B. 2293, CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1262.
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man's lien has evolved from a remedy which was essentially based on
private self-help to one which currently necessitates participation by the
state and compliance with the precepts of due process.
This comment traces the developments foreshadowing the Adams
decision and discusses its impact and the legislative response. It ex-
plores the safeguards now appended to the garageman's statutory en-
forcement rights and considers whether the procedures embodied in
Senate Bill 2293 fulfill the due process mandates of the United States
Supreme Court.4  This comment also examines the legislative delega-
tion of a lien foreclosure power to the Department of Motor Vehicles.
In order to evaluate the effect of Senate Bill 2293 in perspective, a
preliminary analysis of the former California garageman's lien law and
the judicial response to its enforcement procedures is imperative.
STATUTORY GARAGEMAN'S LIEN LAW PRIoR
To SENATE BILL 2293
The garageman's possessory lien, as codified in the California Civil
Code,r, is a modem example of the artisan's and mechanic's liens which
were recognized at common law." This codification, whicli remains in
effect after the passage of Senate Bill 2293,7 provides that when a ga-
rageman has possession of a vehicle for which repair charges have not
been paid, he is entitled to a lien on that vehicle to enable him to se-
cure payment for repairs and labor he has performed or for supplies
or materials he has furnished for the vehicle. The garageman's lien,
however, is limited to a maximum recovery of $300 for any work, ser-
vice, or repairs performed, unless prior to commencing such work, the
garageman gives notice in writing and obtains consent for the making
of repairs from the legal owner of the automobile.' If the total for
any repair charge authorized by the registered owner is less than $300,
the lien attaches regardless of the consent or knowledge of the legal
owner.
9
4. The due process requirements of the United States and California Constitutions
have been held to be identical in scope and purpose. MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified
Enterprises Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 170, 174 n.4, 103 Cal. Rptr. 522, 524 n.4 (1972);
Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 245, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311
(1962); Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal. App. 700, 181 P. 844 (1919).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §§3051, 3068(a).
6. Mortgages Securities Co. v. Pfaffman, 177 Cal. 109, 169 P. 1033 (1917); J.
DARLINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 40-41 (1891); W.
FRYER, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY 400, 418 (3d ed. 1938); J. SCHOULER, LAw
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 279-80 (1907).
7. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1262, amending CAL. CIV. CODE §§3052, 3068(b), 3071,
3072, CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§22705, 22851, adding CAL. CIV. CODE §3071.5.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§3051a, 3068(b).
9. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Rater, 214 Cal. App. 2d 493, 29 Cal. Rptr.
631 (1963).
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This codification of the garageman's lien law in California was a sig-
nificant expansion of the common law. 10 At common law, the posses-
sory lienholder had no power of sale,1 and any sale to foreclose the
lien was conversion. 2 Unless the parties had contracted otherwise, the
lienholder at common law was required to obtain judgment and levy
execution on the chattel. 3 In contrast, the California statutory law
provided, prior to Senate Bill 2293, that if the owner of a vehicle neg-
lected or refused to pay the garageman's bill within 10 days from when
payment was due, the garageman in possession could commence pro-
ceedings to sell the vehicle at a public auction.' 4  However, prior to
enforcing his lien, the garageman was required to give 20 days' notice
by registered mail to the registered and legal owners of the vehicle.'3
If the vehicle was worth less than $200, the required notice period was
only 10 days.' 6 In addition, prior to the sale of the automobile, the
Department of Motor Vehicles was statutorily required to attempt noti-
fication of the owners,17 and after the sale the Department was re-
quired to follow a procedure by which it again notified the legal and
registered owners and, only after a waiting period of five days from
that notification, changed the registration.' The legal owner of a vehi-
cle worth more than $200 had the right to redeem it within 20 days
after the sale.' 9
The lienholder's right to possession was absolute until the bill was
paid or the car was sold,20 but if the garageman surrendered possession,
the lien was dissolved.2 The garageman also had an absolute right
to sell the vehicle to satisfy the debtor's obligation, and the exercise
of this right was not subject to any form of judicial scrutiny; the lien
was executed through self-help, and the garageman could permanently
deprive the owner of his vehicle through the extrajudicial process of
public sale. As this statutory scheme did not provide for an eventual
10. Quist v. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748, 755, 99 P. 204, 207 (1908).
11. J. DARIUNGTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 42, 45
(1891); W. FRYER, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY 418 (3d ed. 1938); J. SCHOULMER,
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 292-93 (1907).
12. R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §119 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Mhite v. White, 11 Cal. App. 2d 570, 54 P.2d 482 (1936).
14. CAL. Civ. CODE §3052, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 781, §1, at 2775;
CAL. Crv. CODE §3071, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 3, §3, at 1791.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE §3052, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 781, §1, at 2775; CAL.
CIV. CODE §3072, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 3, §3, at 1792.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE §3073.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE §3052, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1959, e. 781, §1, at 2775;
CAL. CIV. CODE §3072, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 3, §3, at 1792.
18. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §5909.
19. CAL. CIV.. CODE §3074.
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Silva, 200 Cal. 494, 254 P. 262 (1927).
21. Lundblade v. Pierce, 95 Cal. App. 192, 194, 272 P. 329, 330 (1928): Goodman
v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 62 Cal. App. 702, 707, 217 P. 1078, 1080 (1923).
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hearing before an impartial magistrate, these enforcement provisions
were more oppressive than the prejudgment remedies held unconstitu-
tional in Sniadach and its progeny;2 2 those prejudgment remedies re-
quired a claimant to eventually prove the validity of his claim in court.
Thus the California Legislature had effectively installed the garage-
man as judge, jury, and executioner.23
Recent amendments to the Automotive Repair Act24 had, even be-
fore the enactment of Senate Bill 2293, somewhat lessened the harsh-
ness of the garageman's lien law. This Act provides that the garageman
can no longer bill for labor or parts without the consent and authoriza-
tion of the customer. However, when the nature of the work necessary
was fraudulently misrepresented by the repairman or the work was au-
thorized at an agreed upon price but the labor was performed in an
unworkmanlike manner or the parts defectively installed, the owner of
the automobile was severely limited in his choice of remedies. Short
of paying the alleged amount owing and then affirmatively seeking
to recover the overcharge, he could not regain possession prior
to the sale. 25 The owner could not resort to self-help in regaining
his vehicle, since a misdemeanor penalty attaches to such action,2 6 nor
could he maintain an action for conversion, since retaining possession
subject to a lien is a defense to such an action.27 The owner did have,
on a vehicle worth more than $200, a right of redemption which
could be exercised within 20 days after sale of the vehicle,2 , but
if he exercised this right, he was obligated to pay the costs of litigation,
the full amount of the claim, and 12 percent interest.29 As the debtor
had little assurance that any legal action taken in an attempt to prevent
the sale would be successful, 30 the potential unfairness to him was
manifest. Since the debtor-owner lost the use of his vehicle and risked
its permanent loss, he could be coerced into paying the full amount
demanded, whether or not the claim of the garageman was just.3 1
22. See text accompanying notes 32-62 infra.
23. Comment, The Application of Sniadach to Banker's and Garageman's Liens,
4 SNv. U.L. REv. 285, 303 (1972).
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§9884.8, 9884.9.
25. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 386 (1973).
26. CAL. Cirv. CODE §3075.
27. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 155 n.15, 520 P.2d
961, 966 n.15, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150 n.15; 2 WrrmN, SummARY OF CALiFoRNiA LAw,
Torts §144 (7th ed. 1960).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE §3074.
29. Id.
30. See text accompanying notes 84-91 infra.
31. See Comment, The Application of Sniadach to Banker's and Garageman's
Liens, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 285 (1972).
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In a series of cases decided since Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,"2 the United States and California Supreme Courts have held
that procedural due process requires provision to the debtor of notice
and the opportunity for a hearing before the state8 may deprive
him of any significant property interest, including temporary use and
enjoyment of the property.84 Exceptions to this principle are justified
only when "extraordinary circumstances" 35 require protection of the in-
terests of the state or the creditor.36 In Sniadach, a case which involved
a Wisconsin wage garnishment statute, the Supreme Court ruled that
garnishment of a debtor's wages before judgment and without notice and
hearing constitutes a denial of Vrocedural due process under the four-
teenth amendment.3 7  The opinion of the Court emphasized that one of
the greatest evils of wage garnishment prior to judgment is its ability to
coerce the poor into paying unconscionable or fraudulent obligations. 3
Because such garnishment could "drive a wage earning family to the
wall," 9 it was found to be an obvious violation of due process. The
California Supreme Court followed the constitutional principles set
forth in Sniadach and held that California's wage garnishment statute,
although different from that of Wisconsin, exhibited the same vices and
was therefore unconstitutional.40 In 1971 the court extended the re-
quirements of notice and hearing to other summary procedures: it de-
clared California's claim and delivery statute unconstitutional in Blair
v. Pitchess41 and found prejudgment attachment of checking accounts
to be violative of due process in Randone v. Appellate Department.42
In a 1972 case, Fuentes v. Shevin,43 the United States Supreme Court
extended the Sniadach rationale to the seizure of household goods
under a writ of replevin. The replevin provisions permitted reposses-
32. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
33. The due process requirements of notice and hearing are not applied to takings
by private parties. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-301 (1966).
34. See Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditor's Rights:
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003 (1973), continued in
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973); Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The
Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355 (1973); Comment, The Application
of Sniadach to Banker's and Garageman's Liens, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 285 (1972).
35. See text accompanying notes 49-60 inira.
36. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
37. Id. at 342.
38. Id. at 340-41.
39. Id. at 341-42.
40. Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970);
McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
41. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
42. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
43. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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sion of goods upon default of payment under conditional sales con-
tracts. An affidavit was filed to that effect,44 a writ was issued ex
parte, without notice to the debtor, and the sheriff was then statutorily
obligated to seize the property.45 If a counter-bond, which would al-
low the debtor to reacquire the goods, was not posted, the sheriff would
place the property in the hands of the creditor.46  The Court empha-
sized that except in "extraordinary circumstances," the due process
rights of notice and hearing must be accorded to the debtor before he
is deprived of any significant property interest by the state. The
Court also stated that even "a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of prop-
erty is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in terms of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
48
Sniadach and Fuentes have preserved summary deprivation in the
"truly unusual" or "extraordinary" cases in which special protection is
properly extended to a state or creditor interest. In Sniadach
the Court cited examples 49 which fall into this exceptional category:
attachment of a nonresident's property, 50 execution on a bank stock-
holder's property,51 appointment of a conservator to take possession of
a federal savings and loan association, 52 and governmental seizure of
mislabeled goods. 53  In Fuentes the Court delineated the types of sit-
uations previously deemed to be "extraordinartr":
First. . . the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an im-
portant governmental or general public interest. Second, there has
been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the per-
son initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible
for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.54
The Fuentes Court made it clear that the ordinary creditor's interest
in collecting his debts, even coupled with the state's interest in ensuring
that just debts are paid, does not justify denial of notice and opportunity
to be heard before seizure takes place.55 In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
44. Id. at 76-77.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 90.
48. Id. at 85.
49. 395 U.S. at 339.
50. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921).
51. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
52. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947).
53. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberg, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1950).
54. 407 U.S. at 91.
55. Id. at 90-93.
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Co.,5" decided subsequent to Adams v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles in 1974, the United States Supreme Court extended the scope
of "extraordinary circumstances" to include situations in which a debtor
can effectively encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of property
in his possession prior to judgment. Under facts similar to Fuentes the
Court ruled that a writ of sequestration could be granted on the cred-
itor's ex parte application without affording the debtor notice or an op-
portunity for a hearing. 57 However, the Court limited the applicability
of the ex parte writ to instances in which its issuance is authorized
by a judge upon a creditor's verified affidavit and after the filing of
sufficient bond.58  The debtor, in these instances, is able to regain the
property by posting a counter-bond.59 In accommodating the respec-
tive interests of the parties, the Court determined that temporary pos-
session of the property should lie with the party who is able to furnish
protection against loss or damage pending trial on the merits.10
Thus Sniadach and its progeny have established that a debtor must
be afforded procedural due process protections if (1) a creditor seeks
to deprive him of a substantial property interest, (2) no overriding
state or creditor interest jilstifies -the summary taking, and (3) state
action is involved in the deprivation. Usually, when debts arising from
private transactions are sought to be enforced, the predicative issue is
whether state action exists since the extent to which the notice and
hearing requirements of due process must be afforded to the debtor
depends upon whether the enforcement of the creditor's claim can
in some way be attributed to the state.61  This element was readily
found in Sniadach, Fuentes, and -the California cases, since the depriva-
tion in each case was accomplished by state agents.0 2
INVALIDATION OF CALIFORNIA GARAGEMAN'S LIEN LAW
A California court first considered the constitutional validity of the
garageman's lien in Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service.63  In that case the
56. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
57. id. at 1901.
58. Id. at 1899.
59. Id. at 1900.
60. Id. at 1905.
61. Ever since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court has
clearly established the principle that the fourteenth amendment does not prevent individ-
ual incursions upon constitutional rights; rather, "It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the amendment." Id. at 11.
62. For recent examples of insufficient state participation for purposes of proce-
dural due process see Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1973) (automobile repossession); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521
P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (banker's lien).
63. 32 Cal. App. 3d 257 (1973), rehearing granted, Civ. No. 2-41502 (June 1,
1973).
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owners' car had ceased to function properly after it was repaired, and
the car was towed to the repairman's garage for further work. When
the owners protested an additional charge, the garageman refused to
release the car until the bill was paid. The court had little difficulty
in extending the constitutional mandates of procedural due process to
the garageman's possessory lien. Relying on Sniadach, Fuentes, Ran-
done, and Blair, the court of appeal held that the temporary retention
of the vehicle by the garageman without notice and hearing to the
debtor constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law
and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Almost as an afterthought, the
court addressed itself to the issue of state action; however it quickly
dismissed the matter by citing Reitman v. Mulkey 4 for the proposition
that a statute which encourages an individual to violate the con-
stitutional rights of another is treated as though the state itself
violated the right. Reliance was also placed upon Kruger v. Wells
Fargo Bank,6 5 in which the court of appeal applied the Reitman prin-
ciple to invalidate the private conduct of a bank in depriving a debtor
of his property without a hearing. This first-impression interpretation
of the constitutionality of the possessory garageman's lien proved to be
short-lived. When the California Supreme Court granted a hearing in
Kruger, the Quebec court on its own motion ordered a rehearing."
One year after the Quebec decision, the California Supreme Court
ruled upon the constitutionality of a garageman's right to enforce his
lien in Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles.6 7  In Adams the
owner refused to pay a bill for unauthorized work, and the garageman
sought to enforce his statutory lien on the vehicle. In mandamus pro-
ceedings the court invalidated the enforcement provisions 8 of the ga-
rageman's lien law, finding them to be violative of the due process pro-
visions of the United States and California Constitutions.69 Further-
more, it issued a writ prohibiting the Department of Motor Vehicles
from processing or otherwise acting on any application for the transfer
of registration pursuant to any lien sale conducted under those stat-
utes.70
64. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
65. 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1973), rev'd, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521
P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974).
66. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 150 n.7, 520 P.2d
961, 963 n.7, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 n.7 (1974).
67. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
68. CAL. CiV. CODE §3071, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 3, §3, at 1791; CAL.
Civ. CODE §§3072-3074.
69. 11 Cal. 3d at 157, 520 P.2d at 967-68, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52.
70. Id. at 157-58, 520 P.2d at 968, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
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In order to sustain its holding, it was essential for the Adams court
to find the presence of state action. Relying on several cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court,7 the court stated, "[D]irect in-
volvement is not necessary to a determination of state action, for private
conduct may become so entwined with governmental action as to be-
come subject to the constitutional limitations placed on state action
. . 72 The Adams court determined that the state's involvement in
the imposition and enforcement of a garageman's lien through the par-
ticipation of the Department of Motor Vehicles was sufficient to consti-
tute state action. 73 This involvement, the court indicated, was more
than "ministerial" in nature because the preparations for the sale were
actively supervised by the Department, and the Department was statu-
torily required to recognize and record transfer of title.7 4 In addition,
the court maintained that the statutory scheme delegated the traditional
function of lien enforcement to the garageman and enabled him to pass
good title to a vehicle that was not his own. 75 Since the repair contract
between the parties did not provide for seizure or sale, the Adams court
found that the garageman's actions were authorized only by statute.
70
The garageman argued that the controlling decision on this point was
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,7 7 in which it was held that the existence
of state-conferred benefits and state regulations alone would not trans-
form private conduct into state action. The court, however, found,
Irvis is distinguishable. . . since there the state simply licensed the
lodge to sell liquor and was not involved in and in no way encour-
aged 'the acts of discrimination complained of. Here, in contrast,
the lien is expressly provided for by statute, its execution by sale is
authorized by statute, and a state agency oversees the sale and re-
cords the transfer of title. 78
Upon finding the presence of state action, the Adams court deter-
mined that the enforcement of the garageman's lien deprived the deb-
tor of a substantial property interest. Finding that the garageman's
lien law was not limited to those specific situations which Fuentes de-
lineated as "extraordinary, ' 79 the court also held that the summary pro-
71. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
72. 11 Cal. 3d at 152, 520 P.2d at 964, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
73. Id. at 153, 520 P.2d at 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See also Horowitz & Karst,
The California Supreme Court and State Action under the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Leader Beclouds the Issue, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1421 (1974).
74. 11 Cal. 3d at 153, 520 P.2d at 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
78. 11 Cal. 3d at 153, 520 P.2d at 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
79. Id. at 154, 520 P.2d at 965-66, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50.
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cedure of lien enforcement was not excepted from the requirements
of notice and hearing.80 The court next determined that the garage-
man's lien statutes did not afford the debtor these due process re-
quisites."' As it pointed out, the 20-day period of redemption, coupled
with the 30-day presale period, gave the owner of a vehicle worth more
than $200 only 50 days in which to obtain a hearing.8 2 If the vehicle
was worth less than $200, the court emphasized, its owner could
irretrievably lose the car after only 20 days. 3
The Adams decision held that in light of the inadequacies in -the
notice requirements imposed by the garageman's lien law, none of the
avenues of judicial relief available to the debtor provided him with suf-
ficient certainty that a hearing would take place prior to his loss of all
rights in the vehicle.84 In view of the fact that California does not pro-
vide for accelerated hearings on contested lien claims,88 the owner had
little assurance that a trial could be held within the minimum period
preceding transfer to the buyer. Therefore, reasoned the court, a ve-
hicle owner had to resort to a temporary restraining order and an in-
junction in order to stay the sale and transfer pending adjudication.86
However, with regard to this remedy the court stated that "[s]ince [a]
temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is thus discretion-
ary . . . it lacks the certainty necessary to insure a hearing prior to
permanent deprivation."8" While a motion to specially set might be
made, the court noted that this motion was also discretionary8 8 and, ac-
cordingly, lacked certainty of relief.8 9 If the vehicle was worth less
than $500, relief could be sought in small claims court, but the Adams
court emphasized that the owner had to act immediately" since his case
would be heard between 10 and 30 days following the filing of the ac-
tionY'
On the issue of interim retention of the debtor's vehicle, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court explicitly declared that the possessory aspect of
the garageman's lien, which allows a temporary deprivation of the
owner's vehicle, does not violate the principles of Sniadach.9 In dis-
80. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
81. Id. at 155-56, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
82. id.
83. Id. at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
84. Id.
85. CAL.. RULES OF CoURT, rules 220, 509.
86. 11 Cal. 3d at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
87. Id.
88. CAL. RULEs OF COURT, rules 225, 513.
89. 11 Cal. 3d at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
90. Id.
91. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1 17d.
92. 11 Cal. 3d at 154, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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tinguishing Sniadach and its progeny from the case at hand, 93 the
Adams court emphasized that the possessory interest of the creditor in
those previous cases, which involved temporary deprivation of the use
and enjoyment of property, was markedly different from the interest
of the garageman. The rationale underlying the court's finding was
that the garageman supplies his own labor and materials to the
vehicle,94 and that in contrast, the Sniadach-type general creditor has
no more than a purely pecuniary interest in the chattel which is un-
related to the property itself.95 The Sniadach progeny were further
distinguished by the court on the ground that in those instances
[the] creditors . . . sought assistance of a state officer or pro-
ceeded under color of state law to alter the status quo either by dis-
possessing debtors or by diverting rights or benefits owed the debt-
ors by -third parties. Here, however, the creditor is in rightful
possession at the time he asserts his lien. To strike down the ga-
rageman's possessory lien would be to alter the status quo in favor
of an opposing claimant; the garageman would be deprived of his
possessory interest precisely as were -the debtors in Shevin and
Blair.96
At first glance the Adams court's sanctioning of temporary depriva-
tion of a debtor's property by the creditor seems diametrically opposed
to established due process principles. In essence, however, the Adams
rationale embodies the same balancing test which has been considered
by the courts since Sniadach. The Adams court, after weighing the
competing interests of the parties in the situation before it, found that
the balance was in favor of the creditor. It is this finding for the cred-
itor which constitutes a departure from Sniadach and those subsequent
cases which found the debtor's interest to be the weightier. In Snia-
dach the majority found wages to be a type of property interest which
merited special protection. The Court determined that garnishment
created such creditor leverage that the debtor was forced to concede
to even fraudulent claims in order to survive.9 7 Similarly, in Goldberg
v. Kelley"s the Court held that a welfare recipient's interest in survival
outweighed the government's interest in conservation of fiscal and ad-
ministrative resources, which interest the government forwarded by
terminating welfare benefits prior to an evidentiary hearing.
93. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974), which held constitutional
the Louisiana sequestration statutes that allowed temporary deprivation of a debtor's
property without notice and hearing, was decided subsequent to the Adams decision.
94. 11 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
97. 395 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1969).
98. 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
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The California Supreme Court had implied in earlier decisions that
it utilized a balancing-of-the-interests analysis in determining whether
satisfaction of the notice and hearing requirements of procedural due
process was necessary before a temporary deprivation could take place.
In Blair v. Pitchess the court stated, "Under the reasoning of Sniadach a
taking such as that involved in claim and delivery procedure violates
due process if it occurs prior to a hearing on the merits unless justified
by weighty state or creditor interests."99  In Randone v. Appellate De-
partment this balancing test was discussed in terms of extraordinary cir-
cumstances:
[Riather than creating a special constitutional rule for wages, the
Sniadach opinion returned the entire domain of prejudgment reme-
dies to the long-standing procedural due process principle which
dictates -that, except in extraordinary circumstances, an individual
may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without notice
and hearing.' 00
The statements in these previous cases laid the foundation for the
Adams court to find a weighty creditor interest that justified a
prejudgment taking without affording the debtor the opportunity
for notice and a hearing. By establishing that the creditor's in-
terest was indeed significant under the Fuentes and Blair defini-
tions, 1° 1 the court placed the proverbial shoe on the other foot and
sanctioned the garageman's temporary retention of the automobile
pending judicial resolution of the underlying dispute as to the repair
bill.
It can be contended that the Adams holding on the validity of the
garageman's possessory lien is specious in light of the recent Mitchell
decision, in which the United States Supreme Court condoned prejudg-
ment possession when a bond was posted by the creditor, a writ of se-
questration was issued by a judge upon affidavits, and an opportunity
for an immediate hearing was made available to the debtor to deter-
mine whether the writ should be maintained or dissolved.10 2 However,
the distinction can be made that these safeguards need only append
to a general type of lien, and that, in contrast, the Adams decision was
specifically predicated on the fact that the garageman held a particular
lien on the vehicle since he added to it his own labor and materials.
Furthermore, a broader interpretation of Mitchell suggests that the
Court is now striving to balance the competing interests of the creditor
and of the debtor.
99. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 278, 486 P.2d 1242, 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 56 (1971).
100. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1971).
101. 11 Cal. 3d at 155, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
102. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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In Adams the California Supreme Court limited its determination of
unconstitutionality to the enforcement aspect of the garageman's lien
and determined that in order for a garageman to collect his claim, he
must henceforth utilize those existing remedies which are consonant
with due process.1 03  The court further noted that the legislature could
specify additional remedies if it determined that the current avenues
of relief for the debtor were inadequate or it felt that additional reme-




The Adams decision reflects a judicial determination that procedural
due process safeguards will be adequately adhered to if the parties pur-
sue their respective claims under existing remedies. Accordingly, any
legislative response to Adams is, constitutionally, a superfluity. The
main thrust of Senate Bill 2293 is the amendment of section 3071 of
the Civil Code to permit the holder of a possessory motor vehicle lien to
sell the vehicle in satisfaction of his lien if one of the following circum-
stances exists: (1) A judgment has been entered in favor of the lien-
holder on the claim which gives rise to the lien; (2) the registered and
legal owners have released their interest in the vehicle; or (3) an au-
thorization to conduct the lien sale has been issued by the Department
of Motor Vehicles. With respect to the last circumstance, a lienholder
must apply to the Department for authorization to conduct a lien sale.
The garageman is required to submit, under penalty of perjury, a state-
ment of the amount of the lien, the facts giving rise to the lien, and
a declaration of his lack of information or belief that there is a valid
defense to the claim which gives rise to the lien. Upon receipt of the
application, the Department must notify the registered and legal own-
ers by certified mail that it will authorize the lien sale unless the owners
return to the Department, within 20 days, a declaration that they desire
to contest the garageman's claim.
A. The New Role of the Department of Motor Vehicles
The practical effect of Senate Bill 2293 is to provide an expedient
procedure whereby the garageman may collect his debt if the owner
103. 11 Cal. 3d at 157, 520 P.2d at 968, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
104. Id. "Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class, shall have
a lien upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material
for value of such labor done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide,
by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens." CAL. CONST. art. XX,
§ 15.
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is willing to release his interest in the vehicle. However, by al-
lowing the Department of Motor Vehicles to authorize a sale of
the owner's vehicle upon his failure to respond to the notice sent to
him by the Department, the California Legislature may have provided
a major ground upon which Senate Bill 2293 can be challenged. This
power of lien foreclosure which has been vested in the Department by
the legislature is arguably so inherently judicial that its delegation to
an administrative agency violates the separation of powers provision of
the California Constitution.' °5
The propriety of a legislative delegation of judicial powers to adminis-
trative agencies has been in question since the 1936 California Su-
preme Court decision in Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion,10 6 which held that state administrative agencies not vested with
judicial powers under the state constitution could not be so empowered
by the legislature. Professor Davis has contended that certain judicial
powers cannot be delegated to any organ of government other than a
court. 0 7  Commenting on decisions in which delegation of adjudica-
tory power has been upheld by the courts, Davis stated, "An examina-
tion of the cases upholding such delegation shows that the subject mat-
ter generally involves new functions of government, committed in the
first instance to administrative authorities and not previously exercised
by the courts."'""
The subject matter committed to the Department of Motor Vehicles
by Senate Bill 2293 is clearly not a new function of government.
Though the garageman's lien is of statutory origin, 0 9 foreclosure of
liens is a function traditionally performed by the courts. "The enforce-
ment of liens, whether equitable or statutory, is a well-recognized
function of courts of equity; and the only distinction in this respect be-
tween the different kinds of liens is, that in the case of the latter equity
will interpose only where there is no other adequate remedy.""'
Moreover, the lien foreclosure procedure involves a determination of
the rights of private party opponents. "The settlement of disputes be-
tween individual contestants is the very raison d'tre and primary oc-
cupation of the courts of justice, and in the grant to administrative
105. "The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Per-
sons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others
except as permitted by this Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. III, §3.
106. 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
107. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATnvE LAW TREAnsn §2.13 (1958).
108. Id. §2.12, at 131.
109. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 152, 520 P.2d 961,
965, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (1974).
110. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc'y v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 138 Cal.
257, 259, 71 P. 334, 334 (1903).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6
bodies of such functions the greatest strain of all is placed upon the
separation of powers.""'
The California Supreme Court has, on at least two occasions, ad-
dressed the problem of administrative resolution of a private party's
complaint against another private party. The first case, Western Metal
Supply Co. v. Pillsbury,"2 involved a workmen's compensation award
made by the Industrial Accident Commission. The court determined
that the power to settle the rights of private parties was strictly judicial
and upheld the delegation of power only because there was a special
constitutional provision for workmen's compensation awards."8  In
Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock" 4 the challenged legislation
authorized the Director of Agriculture to fix the amount of damages
due for the failure of a distributor to pay for milk products delivered
to him. The court held this to be an unconstitutional delegation of
power.
1 1 5
It could be argued that the function of the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles in authorizing a vehicle sale is purely ministerial rather than judi-
cial. The Department neither conducts a hearing nor exercises any dis-
cretion beyond the cursory inspection of the garageman's affidavit to
determine whether the requisite averments are contained therein. This
function does not fall squarely within the traditional definition of "ad-
judication," which concentrates on the procedure whereby an agency
determines what the facts are in relation to specific private rights.,,
However, a more apt definition of "adjudication" would appear to be
as follows: "The question whether judicial powers have or have not
been validly conferred is determined not by the manner in which the
issues are decided but by the character of the issues which are referred
to the administrative body for decision."' " 7
Focusing upon the character of the issue referred to the Department
of Motor Vehicles for decision, it is evident that it involves private party
opponents and is one which has traditionally been resolved by the
111. Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. Rav.
261, 295 (1935).
112. 172 Cal. 407, 156P. 491 (1916).
113. Id. at 413, 156 P. at 494.
114. 13 Cal. 2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
115. Id. at 651-52, 91 P.2d at 594.
116. "Generally speaking, a legislative action is the formulation of a rule to
be applied to all future cases, while an adjudicatory act involves the actual application
of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts." Strumsky v. San Diego County Em-
ployees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 35 n.2, 520 P.2d 29, 33 n.2, 112 Cal. Rptr.
805, 809 n.2 (1974).
117. Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REv.
261, 275 (1935).
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courts. Furthermore, the function performed by the Department of
Motor Vehicles closely resembles the entry of a default judgment, both
in the procedures followed and, more significantly, in the net effect
conveyed. In fact, since the "judgment" of the Department is there-
after executed by the garageman, it is more drastic than default judg-
ments, which may require the aid of a sheriff to be executed." 8
However, certain default judgments may be entered by the clerk
of the court. Section 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes
the clerk to enter a default judgment when personal service has
been obtained and the action is solely for recovery of money or
damages upon a contract. This action of the clerk has been termed
strictly ministerial,1 9 and his authority in these cases has been limited.
"It has been held in a number of cases that a clerk has the power to
enter judgment only where the proper amount appears from the terms
of the contract as alleged in the complaint or follows therefrom by mere
mathematical computation.' 20  One California decision upheld a
clerk's authority to enter a default judgment when foreclosure of a
mechanic's lien was requested, but the court did so only because the
complaint alleged an express contract as an alternate theory of recovery
and the contract supported the clerk's action.' 21 However, the judg-
ment entered by the clerk in that case was for a money judgment rather
than the requested foreclosure. Foreclosure of a garageman's lien
would likewise appear to be beyond a clerk's authority and should also
fall outside the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Ac-
cordingly, it appears that the legislative delegation of the inherently ju-
dicial function of lien foreclosure to the Department of Motor Vehicles
violates the separation of powers provision of the California Constitu-
tion and is likely to be struck by the courts if challenged.
A further challenge may lie even if the delegation of power to the
Department of Motor Vehicles is upheld against the charge that the
power involved is inherently judicial. In light of the recent California
Supreme Court decision in Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees
Retirement Association,2 2 it is questionable whether any function of
even a quasi-judicial (adjudicative) nature may be delegated to an ad-
ministrative agency. The Strumsky court declined to draw a distinction
between judicial and quasi-judicial powers in holding that the decision
of a local board which determined the amount of death allowance to
which a survivor was entitled constituted an exercise of "true judicial
118. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§681-7132.
119. Landwher v. Gillete, 174 Cal. 654, 656, 163 P. 1018, 1019 (1917).
120. Lynch v. Bencini, 17 Cal. 2d 521, 525, 110 P.2d 662, 665 (1941).
121. Norman v. Berney, 235 Cal. App. 2d 424, 45 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1965).
122. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
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powers.' 23  If the adjudicative actions of administrative agencies
were to be construed as exercises of judicial power, the separation of
powers provision of the state constitution would seemingly render these
administrative actions nullities. It appears, however, that this literal
reading of Strumsky was not intended by the court. The destructive
effect on state and local government of such an interpretation is suf-
ficient to support a less literal interpretation. Had the Strumsky court
intended to absolutely bar administrative agencies from performing
quasi-judicial functions, it would not have merely provided for a
broader scope of judicial review of administrative determinations, but
would have invalidated such determinations altogether.
However, the determination that an act is quasi-judicial rather than
judicial is not enough in itself to ensure judicial approval of the dele-
gation. As Professor Davis has stated, "Judicial opinions which pass
upon the validity of delegation of the power of adjudication rather uni-
formly revolve around adequacy of standards, but in many cases one
may surmise that the motivating force has more to do with presence
or absence of procedural safeguards."' 2 4 This conclusion is reinforced
by language of the California Supreme Court: "Delegated power
must be accompanied by suitable safeguards to guide its use and to pro-
tect against its misuse."'125 Thus, in order to determine the validity
of the delegation of a lien foreclosure power to the Department of
Motor Vehicles, an examination of potential safeguards which adhere
to the exercise of this power is necessary.
The first such safeguard derives from the Department's lack of dis-
cretion under Senate Bill 2293 in authorizing a lien foreclosure. Other
than the purely ministerial task of facially inspecting a garage-
man's affidavit to determine whether it alleges the requisite conditions
for foreclosure authorization, 2 6 the Department lacks authority to
exercise judgment on the question of whether the facts of the contro-
versy between the garageman and the vehicle owner warrant the au-
thorization of a lien foreclosure. This absence of discretionary author-
123. We have in this opinion avoided the use of the term "quasi-judicial"-an
adjective used in some opinions and by some commentators to indicate the pe-
culiar adjudicatory powers possessed by administrative agencies. As we have
indicated, the question here is the extent to which true judicial powers are and
can be vested in "local agencies." "The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi'
is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might
use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed."
Id. at 42 n.14, 520 P.2d at 38 n.14, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 814 n.14 (citation omitted).
124. 1 K. DAvis, ADMImSTRATivE LAw TREATISE §2.10, at 113 (1958).
125. Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 236, 368 P.2d 101,
105, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 505 (1962).
126. CAL. CIV. CODE §3071.
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ity in the Department minimizes the potential for abuse by the Depart-
ment in authorizing a sale of the vehicle. Senate Bill 2293 also con-
tains a second safeguard in that it provides that the vehicle owner is
entitled to a judicial, rather than departmental, determination of the
enforceability of the lien if he notifies the Department of his intention
to contest the garageman's claim. However, the viability of this second
safeguard is dependent upon the vehicle owner's receipt of notice from
the Department that the garageman desires to enforce his lien."' 7
The most effective procedural safeguard against potential misuse of
the power of the Department of Motor Vehicles to foreclose upon a
garageman's lien would be the availability of judicial review. Civil Code
Section 3071, as amended, does not provide for judicial examination of
the Department's authorization of lien foreclosures, and it remains to
be considered whether a means for obtaining judicial review exists in-
dependently of Senate Bill 2293. Injunctive relief against the Depart-
ment's exercise of its power of foreclosure authorization would appear
to be unavailable. California cases have held that an injunction may
not be used in lieu of administrative mandamus as a method of review-
ing adjudicatory agency action. 28  Similarly, an action for declaratory
relief to challenge -the propriety of a lien foreclosure by the Department
appears to be unavailable, since at least one decision has held that an
action for declaratory relief may not be prosecuted, in lieu of manda-
mus, to review a final administrative action. 29 The critical determina-
tion thus appears to be whether mandamus will lie to review the action
of the Department in authorizing a lien foreclosure.
Administrative mandamus, as set forth in section 1094.5 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, is a special device used to obtain judicial review
of adjudicatory decisions of state and local governmental bodies. Al-
though the previous discussion concluded that the Department's action
in authorizing a sale of the vehicle could be characterized as quasi-
judicial, or adjudicatory, administrative mandamus nevertheless ap-
pears to be inappropriate for review of such action. The California Su-
preme Court has held that section 1094.5 is applicable only when the
conditions set forth in subdivision (a) thereof (i.e., the holding of a
hearing required by law and the taking of evidence) are present.' 0
Civil Code Section 3071, as amended by Senate Bill 2293, does not
require a hearing or the taking of evidence as a condition to the Depart-
ment's authorization of lien foreclosure.
127. See text accompanying notes 142-168 infra.
128. Tushner v. Griesinger, 171 Cal. App. 2d 599, 341 P.2d 416 (1959); Vincent
Petroleum Corp. v. Culver City, 43 Cal. App. 2d 511, 111 P.2d 433 (1941).
129. Hostetter v. Alderson, 38 Cal. 2d 499, 241 P.2d 230 (1952).
130. Keeler v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 596, 297 P.2d 967 (1956).
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Similarly, a "traditional" mandamus action appears to be an inap-
propriate means of seeking judicial review of the Department's authori-
zation of sale. Traditional mandamus, as set forth in sections 1084-
1097 and 1107-1110b of the Code of Civil Procedure, generally lies ei-
ther to correct an abuse of discretion by an administrative agency. 31 or
to compel performance of a mandatory administrative duty by the
agency.' 32 The relief sought by the vehicle owner following the Depart-
ment's authorization of the foreclosure of the lien upon his vehicle does
not appear to fall within either function of traditional mandamus.
It could be argued that if both forms of mandamus are inappropri-
ate for obtaining review of the foreclosure of a garageman's lien,
then the previously described barriers to injunctive relief would no
longer exist, since injunctive relief has been barred by the courts only
when a mandamus action appeared to lie. However, as the Adams
court indicated, the effectiveness of injunctive relief is diminished by
the discretionary nature of this remedy. 133
Despite the difficulty in identifying the appropriate method of seek-
ing judicial review of the lien foreclosure by the Department of Motor
Vehicles, it appears to be well established that this exercise of adjudica-
tory power cannot escape some form of judicial scrutiny. In a recent
decision of the court of appeal, Pendray v. Board of Trustees,134 it was
held that it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to vest exclu-
sive power in a school board to determine the sufficiency of the facts
necessary to justify dismissal of a probationary teacher, since a proba-
tionary teacher's right to hold his job is a fundamental vested right. The
Pendray court's pronouncement of -the need for judicial review of ad-
ministrative determinations involving fundamental vested rights ap-
pears to be fully applicable to the garageman's lien foreclosure situation
since a vehicle owner's interest in his automobile fits within the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's articulation of a "fundamental vested right": "In
determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not alone
weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human terms
and the importance of it to the individual in the life situation."' 35 Cer-
tainly, in as mobile a state as California, the importance of a vehicle
to its owner in both human and economic terms can be open to little
dispute.
131. Calaveras Unified School Dist. v. Leach, 258 Cal. App. 2d 281, 65 Cal. Rptr.
588 (1968).
132. Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 557, 314 P.2d 67, 76 (1957).
133. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
134. 42 Cal. App. 3d 341, 116 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1974).
135. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144, 481 P.2d 242, 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
244 (1971).
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B. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard
Since the new law places the Department of Motor Vehicles in a
position whereby it, in effect, renders a judgment in favor of the ga-
rageman in the event the debtor fails or neglects to return the declara-
tion within the prescribed time, the law must comport with the require-
ments of procedural due process. Civil Code Section 3071, as
amended, contains detailed provisions which require the Department
of Motor Vehicles to put the debtor on notice that he is entitled to
contest the claim of the garageman in court. The new law demands
that the following must appear in the statement sent by the Department
to the registered and legal owners of the vehicle: (1) The debtor has
a legal right to a hearing in court; (2) if a hearing in court is desired,
the enclosed declaration to that effect must be signed under penalty
of perjury and returned to the Department; (3) if the declaration is
signed, the garageman must file an action in court and will be allowed
to sell the vehicle only if he obtains a judgment or release from the
registered and legal owners; (4) if an action is filed, the registered
and legal owners will be so notified; and (5) the owners may then ap-
pear to contest the claim of the garageman.
The nature of the hearing required for procedural due process was
described by the United States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut:'13 6
That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver,
and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is de-
prived of any significant property interest . . . . [A] state must
afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity -to be heard if it
is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause. 137
To determine whether the newly enacted law complies with the con-
stitutional mandate of an opportunity for hearing outlined in Boddie,
it is necessary to examine two factors-the form of the hearing, to
decide whether the debtor's opportunity to present his case and refute
the claim of the garageman is constitutionally sufficient, and the oppor-
tunity for a hearing, to determine whether the hearing is provided be-
fore the debtor-owner loses his vehicle permanently.
The Court in Fuentes emphasized that "[t]he nature and form of
such . . . hearings . . . are legitimately open to many potential varia-
136. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
137. Id. at 378-79. As the Court maintained, the hearing required by due process
is subject to waiver. National Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). A
waiver of constitutional rights must be made knowingly and intelligently. Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). A waiver
of constitutional rights must at the very least be clear. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
95 (1972).
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tions and are subject, at this point for legislation-not adjudication." '188
Without question, the form of the hearing provided by Senate Bill 2293
satisfies due process standards since Civil Code Section 3071 provides
that if the vehicle owner signs and returns to the Department of Motor
Vehicles a declaration that he desires a hearing in court concerning the
repair bill, the lienholder will be allowed to sell the vehicle only if he
obtains "a judgment in court."
Pursuant to the Adams court's decaration that the Department of
Motor Vehicles is not obligated to conduct the actual hearing on the
garageman's claim, 139 the legislature has exempted the Department
from any such duty and, in Civil Code Section 3071, has instead
charged the Department with the obligation to provide notice to the
vehicle owner that the garageman seeks enforcement of his lien. Thus
the Department's function is to afford the debtor with an opportunity
to be heard. What is critical is that the hearing be conducted before
the garageman enforces his lien by way of sale and in such a manner
as to establish the probable validity of the claim in question.140  Once
the debtor has obtained his opportunity for a hearing by means of the
Department's notification of the garageman's intent to enforce the lien,
the debtor may seek the judicial relief which is clearly available to him
in California.
If the guarantee of due process, as enunciated in Boddie, is to be
fulfilled, it is essential that the opportunity to be heard be granted at
a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. The constitutional
validity of the time for hearing is predicated on the sufficiency of the
notice afforded vehicle owners prior to the authorization of the sale.' 4'
The Adams court indicated that the notice requirements then provided
in Civil Code Sections 3052 and 3072 were insufficient to provide
the debtor ample opportunity to seek judicial relief prior to the enforce-
ment of the lien. 142  It is only after the provision of notice which is
reasonably calculated to inform the debtor of a forthcoming sale that
the debtor will have been afforded an adequate opportunity to be
heard. After such notice is given, the Department can leave the par-
ties to pursue their respective rights in court unless the debtor de-
faults 43 or waives his right to a hearing.
138. 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
139. 11 Cal. 3d at 157, 520 P.2d at 968, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
140. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 96.
141. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950).
142. See text accompanying notes 81-91 supra.
143. "Due process does not, of course, require that the defendant in every civil caso
actually have a hearing on the merits. A State, can, for example, enter a default judg-
ment against a defendant who, after adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance
. ... Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
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Senate Bill 2293 requires notice in the form of certified mail to the
registered and legal owners in the event that the debtor fails to pay
his bill within 10 days and the garageman desires to sell the vehicle.144
Without allowing for the possibility that the owners may be unreach-
able by mail, for whatever reason,145 Senate Bill 2293 nevertheless en-
ables the Department to authorize a sale if the interested parties fail
to respond within 20 days from the date of mailing, rather than from
the date of acknowledgment of receipt. Thus, in a given instance an
authorization may be issued by the Department solely on the garage-
man's assertion that a debt is owing and that he is entitled to enforce-
ment of his lien. Since Senate Bill 2293 provides that the Depart-
ment's authorization of sale is to be accorded finality should the debtor
fail or neglect to return the declaration within the prescribed period,
which may in fact be due to his failure to receive notice at all,' 46 it
is imperative that the debtor be afforded sufficient notice so that his
opportunity to be heard is ensured.
Since a garageman may act erroneously or even maliciously in send-
ing his application to the Department for an authorization to conduct
a lien sale, it is incumbent upon the Department to provide the vehicle
owner with sufficient notice. Failure to provide such notice effectively
denies the debtor the opportunity to contest the garageman's claim and
enables the Department to authorize a lien foreclosure ex parte. In
this sense Civil Code Section 3071 stands on the same faulty footing
as the replevin statute invalidated in Fuentes. As the Court stated in
that case,
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of
the government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it
acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this re-
quirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession
of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substan-
tively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is
especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the ap-
plication of and for the benefit of a private party.
147
144. CAL. CIV. CODE §3071.
145. "[A] generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process because
of the circumstances of the defendant . . . ." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380
(1971). See also Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956). But see Norton
v. Lyon Van & Storage Co., 9 Cal. App. 2d 199, 49 P.2d 311 (1935), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 662 (1936).
146. The perils of mail delivery were vividly portrayed recently by a Sacramento
man's experience. Due to an unexplained one-year delay in delivery of a special-delivery
letter, the man abandoned a lifetime career ambition and instead spent twelve months
in military service. Sacramento Bee, Sept. 19, 1974, at Al, col. 3.
147. 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (emphasis added).
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Even if Mitchell has limited the application of Fuentes with respect
to temporary deprivation of possession, the Court has not deviated from
its stalwart position that notice and hearing must be afforded to the
debtor prior to a permanent deprivation. 148  The Mitchell Court, in
balancing the respective interests of the creditor and debtor, has con-
doned an ex parte temporary deprivation only upon the authorization
of a judge. Arguably, no lesser standard should be applied to a ga-
rageman's lien foreclosure, in which the vehicle owner may be perma-
nently deprived of his vehicle solely upon the garageman's assertion that
a debt is owing to him. 49 Assuming, however, that this power of lien
foreclosure is a valid delegation of authority to the Department of
Motor Vehicles, the notice which must be sent to the owner should pro-
vide him with an ample opportunity to cure any mistake through either
private negotiation or judicial action before a potentially wrongful au-
thorization is issued. As the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.150 stated, "This right to be heard has little reality
or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can
choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or con-
test." 51  Thus if the right to notice is to have any meaning, it must
be afforded to the debtor in such a fashion that he is assured of re-
ceiving it. It is fundamental to the requirements of due process that
the right of notice and opportunity to be heard "must be granted at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'152 A "meaningful
time" contemplates a time when the deprivation can still be pre-
vented;'53 a "meaningful manner" contemplates a manner in which the
notice will "reasonably convey the required information."'' 5  Accord-
ingly, the notice requirements of Fuentes and Mullane should be the
standard, not something less.
The manner of notice required under Senate Bill 2293 is certified
mail, 155 and the time period before the deprivation will be authorized
is 20 days from the date of mailing. Neither provision appears to af-
148. 94 S. Ct. at 1902.
149. See text accompanying notes 105-133 supra.
150. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
151. Id. at 314.
152. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
153. "[N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary
taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 82.
154. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 314. In Mullane
the Court pointed out that "[t]he statutory notice [by publication], to known beneficiaries
is inadequate not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circum-
stances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by
other means at hand." Id. at 319. See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962) (posted notice of intent to divert a river inadequate when the property
owner's home and address could easily be ascertained).
155. CAL. Civ. CODE §3071.
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ford the debtor his constitutionally guaranteed right to sufficient notice
since it is possible that the debtor could be permanently deprived of
his vehicle without receiving actual knowledge. Therefore, the same
anomalous result is reached under the new law as was condemned in
Adams. Since the Department is now so vitally involved in the lien
enforcement procedure, it should be required to make every good faith
effort to locate the owner and give him notice that the garageman has
applied for an authorization of sale and that such authorization will be
issued on the garageman's assertion if the owner fails to respond. In
order to ensure that the vehicle owner will receive notice which will
allow him to protect his rights in the vehicle if he has defenses against
the garageman's claim, the notice should be served on the owner in
the same manner and with the same formalities and safeguards re-
quired for service of process when an ordinary civil action is filed. 158
As in a civil action, once notice is served, the owner should be afforded
at least 30 days in which to answer.
157
Although personal service has not been absolutely required in civil
actions since July 1, 1970,15" the notice should, at a minimum, be ac-
complished by personal delivery or some form of substituted service
"reasonably calculated" to apprise the owners of the sale.159 The notice
could be sent by mail with provisions for acknowledgement of receipt
by the owners.'50 If service by mail is employed to notify an owner in
the state, service should be deemed complete only when the addressee
acknowledges receipt thereof. 16 In the event that the addressee fails to
complete and return the requisite acknowledgement, another method
of service should be employed to notify him.'52 Service by publication
should be permitted under certain conditions, but only if "it appears
. .. that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be
served in another manner . . . .,,6 Constructive service by publica-
tion furnishes sufficient notice to the debtor who endeavors to avoid
service and to frustrate attempts by the Department to locate and di-
rectly notify him of the garageman's intention to sell the vehicle. In
such an instance, the Department of Motor Vehicles should bear the
burden of proving that service was made by publication only as a last
resort. Under this scheme of notice the parties would be placed on
a more equal footing, and any unfair advantage given to the garageman
under Senate Bill 2293 would be removed.
156. Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§415.10-415.50.
157. Cf. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §412.20(3).
158. CAL. CODE CrV. PROC. §415.10.
159. Cf. CAL. CODE Cv. PROC. §415.20.
160. Cf. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §415.30.
161. Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §415.30(c).
162. Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §415.30(d).
163. Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §415.50.
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Since the Department of Motor Vehicle is one of the administrative
agencies enumerated in Government Code Section 11501, it can be
contended that the notice provisions set forth in Government Code Sec-
tion 11505,164 which are applicable to administrative adjudications,
should be the minimum required of the Department.10 5 However, it
has been held that the legislature may enact totally new procedures for
any of these enumerated agencies.1"6 It should be emphasized that
the adjudication procedures set forth in Government Code Section
11500 et seq. primarily concern those areas in which the public should
be protected. 167 Under Senate Bill 2293, the Department of Motor
Vehicles is, in effect, adjudicating private rights, and as such adjudica-
tion has traditionally been the function of the courts,108 notice similar
to that required in the Code of Civil Procedure should be afforded to
the vehicle owner before any default is entered by the Department due
to the owner's failure to respond.
CONCLUSION
In the Adams decision the California Supreme Court drew a distinc-
tion between the enforcement aspect of a garageman's lien, which the
court determined to be in contravention of the due process precepts
enunciated in a series of cases beginning with Sniadach, and the posses-
sory aspect of the lien, which the court condoned. With respect to the
enforcement aspect, the court indicated that the vehicle owner's due
process rights of notice and hearing would be satisfied if the par-
ties pursued the common law and statutory remedies otherwise avail-
able to them. In light of this determination, a legislative response to
Adams was not strictly necessary. Nevertheless, the California Legis-
lature responded with the enactment of Senate Bill 2293, and in its ef-
forts to expedite the enforcement procedure for the garageman's lien,
164. CAL. Gov'r CODE §11505(c) provides in part, "Service by registered mail shall
be effective if a statute or agency rule requires respondent to file his address with the
agency and to notify the agency of any change, and if a registered letter containing the
accusation and accompanying material is mailed, addressed to the respondent at the lat-
est address on file with the agency." CAL. GOV'T CODE §11505(a)(1) provides in part,
"[Rlespondent may request a hearing by filing a notice of defense as provided in Section
11506 within 15 days after service upon him of the accusation, and . . . failure to do
so will constitute a waiver of his right to a hearing .... "
165. Aluisi v. County of Fresno, 178 Cal. App. 2d 443, 451-52, 2 Cal. Rptr. 779,
783 (1960).
166. Bartosh v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 82 Cal. App. 2d 486, 494, 186
P.2d 984, 988 (1947).
167. The California Legislature has required that the Department of Motor Vehicles
follow the procedures embodied in Government Code Section 11500 et seq. in the areas
of formal hearings for motor vehicle operators concerning their licenses (CAL. VEHICLE
CODE §14112) and suspension, revocation, or refusal to renew certificates, licenses, or
special plates of automobile wreckers (CAL. VEHICLE CODE §11512).
168. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
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it may have subjected the new law to the challenge that it unconstitu-
tionally delegates an inherently judicial function to an administrative
body.
Senate Bill 2293 generally appears to embody the Adams rationale
by specifying detailed provisions in an attempt to satisfy both the notice
and hearing elements of procedural due process. However, the fore-
going discussion demonstrates that the new law, in certain provisions,
fails to comply with procedural due process safeguards. These safe-
guards would be maintained if the notice provisions of the new law
were more closely patterned after the notice provisions for ordinary
service of process. Since the act is provisional,"6 9 these recommenda-
tions are offered toward the objective of striking a balance of fairness
between the right of the garageman to enforce his lien based on a valid
claim and the right of the vehicle owner to obtain notice and hearing
before being crippled by an indiscriminate authorization of sale of his
vehicle.
Margaret Sparrow Shedd
169. CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1262, §10. The new law is operative through December
31, 1976.

